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To live together with others
– from Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity1 
HAMAUZU,	Shinji
Abstract:
	 At	 the	 turning	point	of	19th	 century	 to	20th	 century,	 from	 the	modern	
period	 to	 the	 contemporary	 period,	 the	 first	 philosopher	who	 regarded	
“others”	as	one	of	 the	fundamental	problems	of	philosophy	and	wrestled	with	
it	 for	 the	first	 time	 in	 the	history	of	European	philosophy	was	 the	 founder	of	
phenomenology,	Edmund	Husserl.	However	he	didn't	 remain	concerned	 the	
problem	of	 “other	minds”,	 such	as	 the	question	 “How	can	 I	get	knowledge	
about	other	minds?”,	but	grasped	the	problem	of	“others”	 in	wider	sense	and	
stated	 it	as	 the	“fundamental	problem	of	phenomenology”.	He	tried	to	discuss	






















“America,	First!”.	He	 is	 supported	by	 those	who	hope	 to	prevent	 foreigners	and	
others	minority	 to	groups	 from	living	 in	America.	Also,	a	referendum	in	the	U.K.	
was	held	in	June	of	this	year,	and	British	citizens	voted	in	favor	of	the	U.K.	to	leave	
the	European	Union,	an	event	commonly	 refered	 to	as	 “Brexit”.	One	of	 reasons	
why	people	voted	 for	 “Brexit”	was	an	antipathy	against	a	growing	numbers	of	
Islamic	refugees	and	migration	to	Britain	in	general.	After	the	vote,	attacks	on	non-








2.　Husserl as founder of philosophy on others
At	 the	 turning	point	of	19th	 century	 to	20th	 century,	 from	 the	modern	
period	to	the	contemporary	period,	 the	first	philosopher	who	regarded	“others”	as	
one	of	 the	 fundamental	problems	of	philosophy	and	wrestled	with	 it	 for	 the	 first	
time	 in	 the	history	of	European	philosophy	was	 the	 founder	of	phenomenology,	
Edmund	Husserl.	It	is	not	accidental	that	many	philosophers	who	were	respectively	
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influenced	by	him	and	 took	over	 the	 spirit	 of	phenomenology	differently,	 e.g.	
Heidegger,	Levinas,	Schutz,	Sartre,	Merleau-Ponty,	 even	 if	 they	used	 the	 term	
“phenomenology”	or	not,	 they	engaged	with	 the	problem	of	“others”	more	or	 less	
in	 their	own	ways,	offering	different	perspectives.	Because	 in	so	 far	as	 they	 turn	
their	eyes	towards	the	 idea	of	“phenomenon”,	 they	cannot	help	ask	“for	whom”	 it	
appears	and	ask	about	the	difference	or	the	sameness	between	the	“phenomenon”	
appearing	 “for	me”	and	appearing	 “for	 the	other”.	 In	 this	sense,	phenomenology	
cannot	help	but	include	the	problem	of	the	“other”	as	one	of	its	essential	concerns	
from	the	beginning.	This	 is	 just	 the	key	of	solving	the	following	enigma:	Why	the	
philosophers	who	were	 influenced	by	Husserl,	despite	 taking	different	directions,	
nonetheless	kept	the	problem	of	“others”	as	central	to	their	work.
Another	 interesting	point	was	 that	 those	philosophers	 took	over	 the	













systematically	controlled	work.	Although	Husserl	afterwards	 intended	 to	 revise	
it	 to	a	precise	German	version,	he	had	other	plans	 for	publication	 in	 those	days.	
The	plan	of	revision	was	not	realized	 in	his	 life,	and	the	original	German	version	
Cartesianische	Meditationen	 was	published	 in	1950	as	 the	 first	 volume	of	 the	
Husserliana ,	 the	complete	works	of	Husserl,	based	on	 the	efforts	of	 the	Husserl	
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Archive	later.	
The	 theory	 of	 “others”	 in	 the	 fifth	meditation	 of	 the	Cartesianian	
Meditations 	 is	nothing	but	 the	 tip	of	an	 iceberg,	works	 that	he	saved	through	his	
wrestling	with	 the	problem,	and	 there	remain	 lengthy	manuscripts	 several	 times	
more	than	the	published	one	about	 the	problem	of	“others”.	They	were	published	
as	Towards 	Phenomenology	of	 Intersubjectivity ,	 the	13th	 to	 the	15th	 volume	of	
Husserliana 	1973.	They	are	composed	of	massive	drafts	 that	began	in	1905	when	




and	were	not	offered	 for	publication.	They	were	not	 expression	of	 a	 finished	
thought,	but	a	document	of	his	thinking	processes	in	a	“state	of	being	born”,	in	his	
unique	style	of	writing	by	 thinking	with	 the	stenography	called	 “Garbersberger”.	
What	must	be	emphasized	here	 is	 that	almost	all	of	 this	work	by	Husserl	 in	these	
three	volumes	are	remained	unknown	to	the	philosophers	I	mentioned	above,	and	






Problematics	of	 “Intersubjectivity”,	Husserl	named	as	a	 title	of	 all	 the	
problems	of	“others”,	are	on	the	one	hand	a	inquiry	into	the	relationship	“between	








like	my	wife,	children,	parents,	 siblings	 “others”.	But	 in	 the	sense	of	 “physically	
separated”	we	can	call	even	the	most	 intimate	 family	members,	everybody	except	
myself,	“others”.	Moreover	there	 is	another	usage	of	 this	 term	according	to	which	
we	call	“other”	or	“different”	or	“foreign”	people	“others”.	For	 instance	women	are	
“others”	 for	men,	children	are	“others”	 for	adults,	elderly	are	“others”	 for	minors,	
foreigners	are	“others”	for	nationals,	and	vice	versa.	To	widen	the	example,	students	





group.	Also,	 the	concept	of	 “others”	doesn't	presuppose	 that	 “others”	are	human	
beings.	After	all,	all	animals	are	“others”	for	humans,	if	we	take	animals	as	subjects,	
humans	are	“others”	e.g.	for	a	wild	bear,	dogs	are	“others”	for	monkeys.	
If	we	 return	 to	human	beings,	 in	everyday	 life,	we	make	contact	with	
“others”.	When	we	greet	them	unintentionally,	talk	about	work	or	study,	go	together	
somewhere	and	do	something	together,	we	know	they	are	“others”,	but	never	think	







“others”	comes	 to	be	used	 in	everyday	 life	 suddenly,	and	 in	 the	 introduction	of	





If	 we	 look	 back	 over	 history	 of	 philosophy,	 the	 European	modern	
philosophy	which	René	Descartes	opened	with	 the	 thought	 “Cogito	ergo	sum 	 (I	
think,	 therefore	 I	am)”	was	 fundamentally	a	philosophy	which	 intended	to	make	
“I”	or	“subject”	the	starting	point,	where	the	theory	of	“others”	was	not	considered	










experiences.	The	English	empiricism	school	 took	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	difference	
between	“I	and	others”	seriously	and	brought	 it	 into	question.	According	to	Locke	
“I”	can't	see	“ideas	 in	the	mind”	of	“others”	and	only	can	reason	them	by	analogy	
through	words	and	bodys	as	outer	 “signs	of	 ideas”.	By	succeeding	 to	Lock's	 idea	
of	“other	minds”	David	Hume	intended	to	consider	“sympathy”	as	a	way	to	“other	
minds”	 in	 “human	nature”.	Although	J.	S.	Mill	 in	19th	century	 tried	 to	explain	 it	
with	“reason	by	analogy”,	 the	German	translator	of	Hume's	A	Treatise	of	Human	
Nature ,	 Theodor	 Lipps	 criticized	Mill's	 discussion	 and	 developed	 “empathy	
(Einfühlung)”	 as	 	 fundament	of	aesthetics	and	ethics.	 In	 this	way,	 the	question	
“How	can	I	get	knowledge	about	other	minds”	was	discussed	in	the	tradition	of	the	
English	empiricism	since	Locke	and	further	by	other	thinkers	in	the	contemporary	
philosophy.	 Ludwig	Wittgenstein 's	 discussions	 from	 his	Tractatus	 Logico-
Philosophicus 	 (Logical-philosophical	Treatise )	 to	his	Philosophical	 Investgations	
on	 “other	minds”	 stayed	 in	 the	 same	 tradition.	We	might	expand	 that	 thought	






4.　How did Husserl’s discussion on “others” come about?
	
How	did	Husserl	develop	an	 interest	 in	 the	question	of	 “others”?	In	 the	
first	investigation	titled	“Expression	and	meaning”	of	his	breakthrough	work	Logical	
Investigations 	vol.2	 (1901),	when	he	mentioned	“expression	 in	the	communicative	
function”	 in	contrast	 to	“expression	 in	 the	solitary	mental	 life”,	he	mentioned	the	
question	of	“others”	for	the	first	time.	He	said	that	communicating	with	words	only	
becomes	possible	by	 “the	 listener's	understanding	 the	 speaker's	 intention”	 and	
“the	 listener's	grasping	the	speaker	as	a	person	who	doesn't	produce	only	sounds	
but	is	talking	to	oneself” .	Thus	he	said,	“speaking	and	listening,	i.e.	the	speaker's	
letting	 the	mental	 experiences	 know	and	 listener's	 receiving	 them	are	 related	
to	each	other.	Therefore	 the	 “expression	 in	 the	communicative	 function”	works	
as	 “sign	 for	 speaker's	 thoughts”	and	he	called	 it	 “function	of	 letting	know”.	The	
listener's	understanding	of	speaker's	 letting	know	is	neither	a	conceptual	knowing	
nor	reasonable	 judging,	but	 it	means	“listener's	 intuitionally	grasping	speaker	as	a	
person	expressing	so	and	so”.	Then	Husserl	said,	“In	the	ordinary	usage	we	apply	
the	word	 'perception'	 to	 the	mental	experience	of	other	persons	and	we	say	 that	
we	'see'	his	or	her	anger	or	pain.	Such	a	usage	is	totally	right.”	He	continued,	“The	
listener	perceives	 the	speaker's	expressing	his	or	her	mental	experiences,	and	 in	




it,	but	no	complete	equality”.	But	his	 interest	concerned	the	 following	 issue;	 that	
“also	in	the	mental	 life	without	transmitting	in	communication,	the	expression	has	
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an	 important	role”,	 that	“even	the	expression	 in	 the	solitary	mental	 life	expresses	




The	 stimulus	 from	 the	 above	mentioned	 Lipps'	 theory	 of	 “empathy”	
seems	to	have	triggered	him	to	consider	 the	problem	of	“others”.	The	publication	







and	Theory	of	Sympathy	and	of	Love	and	Hate 	 (1913)	and	discussed	 the	 theory	
of	 empathy	 critically,	which	was	 a	 common	 interest	with	Husserl.	 It	was	no	
coincidence	that	at	the	same	period	Edith	Stein,	Husserl's	first	assistant,	wrote	her	
dissertation	titeled	Problems	of	Empathy 	(1917).	
But	Lipps'	 theory	cannot	be	 identified	simply	with	 the	above	mentioned	
theory	of	“other	minds”.	Since	the	latter	asks	the	question	“How	can	I	get	knowledge	
of	other	minds?”,	 the	problem	of	“other	mind”	 is	examined	within	the	 intellectual	
inquiry	 of	 “getting	 knowledge”	 and	Mill's	 theory	of	 “reasoning	by	 analogy”	 is	
presented	as	part	of	 the	same	discussion.	From	critics	against	such	 theory,	Lipps	
intended	 to	state	 that	 the	 theory	of	 “empathy”	was	not	an	 intellectual	 theory,	as	
it	had	an	emotional	or	 instinctive	dimension.	 If	we	may	say	more,	Husserl,	by	




idea	of	“pairing	 (Paarung)”	of	my	 lived	body	and	other	 lived	body,	which	we	can	
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find	in	Cartesian	Meditations .	















should	be	 just	 “I	myself”	and	 if	 I	 think	by	entering	 the	one,	 “another	subject”	 is	






of	 “subject”.	Also	usually	we	hear	often	 the	confrontation	between	 “subjective”	
and	 “objective”,	 such	as	 in	 the	usage,	 “His	explanation	 is	 too	subjective”	or	 “Her	
explanation	 is	objective	and	 reliable”.	 “Subjective”	means	biased	 to	one's	own	
opinions	or	points	of	view	and	not	 taking	other's	opinion	 into	consideration,	 thus	
self-satisfied.	In	contrast	to	it,	“objective”	means	not	biased	to	any	specified	opinions	
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or	points	of	view,	not	contaminated	by	 them,	and	seeing	 the	 things	 “as	 it	were”.	
Therefore	“objects”	are	assumed	to	be	independent	from	“subject”	and	beings	(reality)	
in	 themselves,	 independent	 from	whether	 they	become	to	be	known	by	“subjects”	
or	not.	For	instance	the	Andromeda	Galaxy	apart	from	Earth	in	approximately	780	
kiloparsecs	at	the	velocity	of	light	existed	in	itself	since	far	earlier	times	than	it	was	






can	come	 into	effect	only	 in	 the	 frameworks	of	 “subjects”	 (i.e.	 time	and	space	
in	 the	sensitivity	and	 forms	of	category	 in	 the	understanding)	which	Kant	called	









view.	Around	 the	year	of	publishing	Logical	 Investigations 	Husserl	visited	Ernst	
Mach	who	had	used	 the	 term	 “phenomenology”	already.	Probably	recommended	
by	him	Husserl	 read	Richard	Avenarius'	Human	Concept	of	World .	 In	Husserl's	
manuscript	 for	his	 lecture	 “Fundamental	Problems	of	Phenomenology”	 in	 the	first	
volume	of	Towards	Phenomenology	of	 Intersubjectivity 	he	discussed	 the	 “natural	
attitude”	 in	context	with	Avenarius'	 “natural	concept	of	world”	and	began	to	 talk	
about	 the	 idea	of	 “phenomenological	reduction”.	This	 idea	began	to	grow	up	 for	
the	first	 time	during	his	stay	 in	Seefeld	 in	Tirol	 in	 the	summer	of	1905.	While	he	
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had	an	 interest	 in	Kant	 in	 the	background,	Pfänder	and	Daubert,	both	disciples	
of	Lipps,	had	accompanied	his	 stay.	We	can	presume	 that	 the	awaking	of	 the	
idea	of	 reduction	and	the	commitment	with	Lipps'	 theory	of	empathy	 introduced	
by	both	scholars	were	progressing	at	 the	same	time.	 In	order	 to	develop	his	 idea	
of	 “phenomenological	 reduction”	Husserl	 learned	Descartes'	 “methodological	
skepsis”	as	a	method	for	getting	a	view	of	 the	new	world	of	phenomenology,	but	
tried	 to	 interpret	 it	as	a	way	 leading	 to	 the	dimension	of	Kant's	 “transcendental”	
problematics.	But	Husserl	 thought,	 if	he	regarded	 the	 “subject”	as	 functioning	 in	
this	“transcendental”	dimension	as	a	human	being	within	the	world,	he	fell	 into	a	





It	 is	 also	 interesting	 that	Husserl	 in	Cartesian	Meditations 	of	his	 late	
period	 introduced	 the	 term	 “monad”	 from	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibnitz,	 rephrased	
“intersubjective”	with	“intermonadic”,	and	that	his	 interest	 in	this	term	began	very	
early,	almost	in	the	same	period	of	his	interest	 in	the	problem	of	intersubjectivity.	
It	means,	although	 the	problem	of	 “I	and	others”	 can	be	easily	connected	with	
Cartesian	 Egology,	 he	 thought	 about	 it	 in	 the	 connection	with	 Leibnitzian	
Monadology.	The	egological	appearance	was	set	within	the	pluralistic	framework.	
In	 this	way,	 the	 idea	of	 “intersubjectivity”	 didn't	 stay	as	 the	problem	
“between	subject	and	subject”,	but	migrated	to	 the	 idea	 that	“object”	“in	 itself”	 is	
born	 “intersubjectively”.	This	 is	 just	 the	 reason	why	Husserl	came	 in	 the	1920's	
to	 think	that	his	phenomenology	so	far	was	only	“static”	and	intended	to	take	the	
essential	 structure	 in	 the	present	out,	but	 in	order	 to	understand	 the	 structure	
genuinely	 it	must	be	complemented	by	a	 “genetic”	 investigation.	 It	demanded	of	
him	a	 fundamental	change	of	phenomenological	method,	and	at	 the	same	time	 it	
brought	the	above	mentioned	“subject”	 into	the	problematics	of	“intersubjectivity”.	
Neither	 “object”	nor	 “subject”	 is	 something	which	exists	 independently	and	 later	
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goes	 into	 relationship,	 rather	 “subject”	 is	born	 just	within	 the	 relationship	with	
“other	subjects”	and	it's	“genesis”	should	come	into	question.	In	his	 late	period	he	
paraphrased	the	term	“empathy”	he	loaned	from	Lipps	with	the	term	“other/foreign-








that	 they	are	 intertwined	with	most	of	problems	he	 investigated	 in	various	ways.	
Besides	what	I	mentioned	already,	we	can	point	out	their	connection	to	psychology	
(Husserliana	vol.9),	nature	and	spirit	(Husserliana	vol.32),	theory	of	time	(Husserliana	
vol.10,	33,	Materialien 	vol.8),	 the	 lifeworld	 (Husserliana 	vol.6,	39),	 even	 if	we	
can't	 insist	 that	he	developed	them	enough.	It	 is	not	without	reason	that	Towards 	
Phenomenology	of	Intersubjectivity 	with	totally	1,914	pages	are	composed	of	three	
volumes	of	Husserliana 	within	40	volumes	up	to	now	and	overwhelming	in	his	left	
posthumous	manuscripts	not	only	 in	 the	quantity	but	also	 in	 the	 length	of	period	
where	he	discussed	it.	
6.　Ontology and phenomenology
At	any	rate,	why	do	 the	problematics	of	 “intersubjectivity”	 spread	 their	
roots	 so	widely	 in	most	 of	 problems	he	 investigated	 in	his	 phenomenology?	
It	must	have	a	 reason.	One	clue	 for	 it	 lies	 in	 the	nature	of	 “phenomenology”.	
“Phenomenology”	 is	proposed	 in	contrast	 to	 “ontology”	above	all.	 If	we	may	say	
that	“ontology”	is	a	question	of	“What	is	being?”	or	“What	exists?”,	we	can	say	that	
“phenomenology”	 is	a	question	of	“What	 is	a	phenomenon?”	or	“What	appears?”.	
I	would	 like	 to	compare	both	situations	of	 saying	 “Something	exists”	and	saying	
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“Something	appears”.	If	I	say	“Something	exists”,	“For	whom”	is	out	of	the	question,	
whereas	 if	 I	 say	 “Something	appears”,	 “For	whom”	 is	an	 indispensable	question.	
Without	somebody	“for	whom	something	appears”	we	cannot	talk	about	“appearing”	
with	meaning.	
Then,	 that	 something	appears	 for	A	 (me)	and	 that	 it	appears	 for	B	 (the	
other)	 are	not	always	 the	 same	 situation.	There	 is	 a	gap	between	 them	which	
Husserl	 called	 “perspective”	 or	 “aspect”,	 in	 order	 to	 point	 out	 that	 the	 same	
thing	seems	to	appear,	but	a	subtly	different	 thing	appears.	And	 if	A	grasps	 it	as	
“appearance	for	A”,	it	presupposes	already	that	it	has	for	B	a	different	“appearance	
for	B”.	What	is	more,	it	means	that	A	grasps	the	thing	as	something	beyond	it	which	







Husserl	 learned	 from	his	 teacher	Franz	Brentano.	The	situation	 I	 just	mentioned	
that	something	appearing	in	appearance	appears	as	something	beyond	appearance	
is	another	side	of	the	same	coin	as	what	Husserl	said	that	consciousness	is	always	
“consciousness	 of	 something”	 and	 intends	 to	 something	 beyond	 experience.	
“Intentionality”	 is	not	a	 secondary	 relationship	 “between	subject	and	object”,	 in	
which	both	exist	 independently	already,	but	means	a	 “field”	 from	which	 “subject	











In	 parallel	 with	 my	 research	 on	 “ intersubjectivity”	 of	 Husserl 's	
phenomenology,	since	2002	I	have	been	also	engaged	with	the	problem	of	“caring”	
as	one	of	concrete	fields	of	“intersubjectivity”.	With	this	term	“caring”	I	don't	mean	
only	 “nursing”	 for	patients	 in	a	narrow	sense,	but	also	 “caring”	 in	a	wider	sense	
including	 “caring”	 for	children,	elderly,	people	with	various	disabilities,	palliative	
caring	and	up	to	end-of-life	caring,	or	differently	speaking,	up	to	“caring	for	others”	
in	our	everyday	 life,	not	only	 for	humans	but	also	 for	animals	or	plants.	 In	 this	
wide	field,	 from	the	background	of	my	research	of	“intersubjectivity”,	 I	have	been	
engaged	with	 thinking	how	“to	 live	 together	with	others”,	what	 I	cannot	however	
unfortunately	develop	today.




mass	killings	 in	modern	Japanese	history.”	 (July,	26.	2016)	The	suspect,	a	 former	
staff	of	 this	care	facility	 for	people	with	 intellectual	disabilities,	hand-delivered	on	
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